Decades of research establish that political elites hold more ideologically consistent and structured policy preferences than ordinary citizens. Since the late 1970s, American politics, at the elite level, has become increasingly polarized and changes in the news media have made it easier for citizens to find news catering to their ideological tastes. We capitalize on these developments to examine whether ideologically engaged citizens-those who hold strong ideological identities, who are politically informed, and who participate actively in public affairs-match elites in ideological consistency and structure during the age of polarization. We test this hypothesis by applying correlation and measurement modeling techniques to data from multiple National Election Study and Convention Delegate Study surveys. We find that (a) ideologically engaged masses hold more tightly organized opinions than the less engaged every year, but lagged elites by a wide margin in 1980; (b) convention delegates manifest impressive levels of consistency every year; (c) by 1992 engaged citizens had caught up to political elites; and (d) ideological consistency increased substantially over time in the mass public, but only among the most ideologically engaged.
Over the past several decades, American politics has become increasingly polarized at the elite level. Since Democratic and Republican politicians at all levels of government have moved apart on the liberal-conservative spectrum and moderates have vanished from party ranks, the ideological signals coming from them have become much clearer over time. In addition, changes in the delivery of political news have made it easier for citizens to find outlets catering to their ideological tastes. These developments have had a number of salutary effects on mass opinion (Hetherington, 2001) . Foremost among these is the increase in ideological consistency in the minds of politically aware and engaged subsets of the electorate. Today, these citizens hold more tightly organized policy preferences than they did a generation ago (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Layman & Carsey, 2002) . Analysts celebrate these developments as evidence of rising ideological competence. As Bafumi and Shapiro (2009) put it, "The critics who referred to the apparently mindless, non-ideological, non-issue driven voter that Columbia and Michigan scholars found in the 1940s and 1950s surely must change their tune" (p. 20).
There is no doubt that some people now do a better job of structuring their policy views in left-right terms, but without a valid benchmark as to what constitutes desirable performance it is difficult to judge how well organized policy views really are. Some people may do better than in the past, but improving over a baseline of "ideological innocence" does not signify ideological competence. No longer failing does not mean passing with high marks. To assess how well ordinary citizens organize their policy views in the polarized era, we use national party delegates as a standard of comparison. Because national party delegates are so deeply immersed in the world of public affairs (many have attended multiple conventions and/or held political office at the national, state, or local level), they represent an ideal comparison group for evaluating levels of ideological organization. So far as subsets of the electorate match these elites in terms of belief system structure and consistency, we may conclude these citizens demonstrate one element of political competence.
Drawing on theoretical frameworks that emphasize how elite polarization and media signaling affect public opinion, we posit that although ideological innocence prevails throughout much of the mass public, ideologically engaged citizens are now as adept as political elites at structuring their policy views in a coherent fashion. Specifically, we argue that ideologically engaged citizens-those who identify as liberal or conservative, who know where the candidates and parties fall on the ideological spectrum, and who participate actively in politics-structure their policy opinions in left-right terms to the same degree as national party elites. These hypotheses are tested with data from the 1980 surveys and the 1980, 1992, and 2000 Convention Delegate Study (CDS) surveys. Two compelling findings emerge from our statistical investigations. First, consistent with some research, ideologically engaged citizens organize their policy views more economically and efficiently than their less engaged counterparts in the electorate. Second, contrary to decades of research, the policy opinions of ideologically engaged masses and political elites are now organized to an equivalent degree. Put simply, mass-elite differences in opinion consistency and structure have begun to dissolve as the most engaged citizens now bear an unprecedented resemblance to political elites.
Our article proceeds as follows. To begin, we elaborate our conceptual and theoretical framework before deriving our hypotheses. Next, we describe our data and measures. We then utilize correlation and measurement modeling techniques to estimate the degree of attitude consistency and structure in stratified mass and elite samples as well as in mass samples over time. Finally, we summarize our findings, note their limitations, and assess the broader implications they have for understanding public opinion and American politics.
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
Attitudes are latent or unobservable evaluative dispositions, whereas opinions are the observable reports of these dispositions. Attitudes do not exist in isolation, but instead are connected to varying degrees in broader associative networks known as attitude structures. Linked attitudes are described as "constrained" or consistently organized. Converse (1964) defines constraint as "the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes" (p. 207). Analysts test for this by examining relationships between observable issue opinion reports or between latent attitudes and opinion reports.
Prior work identifies two plausible models of attitude consistency and structure. First, the domain-specific model holds that opinions within a given issue cluster derive from a single evaluative disposition unique to that domain (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985) . To elaborate, opinion reports on specific controversies such as health care reform and aid to the poor are shaped by the same latent attitude. In correlation terms, opinions in one domain should covary with one another to a much greater extent than with opinions from other domains. In factor analytic terms, opinion responses in a given domain should load on factors unique to that domain. Second, the ideological model of attitude structure proposes that individuals' positions on various issues derive from points (or narrow bands) on the liberal-conservative continuum (Converse, 1964) . Operationally, the model implies equally robust correlations on policy opinions within and across issue areas and that a single factor generates the observed correlations across all issues.
Research shows that variation in discrete cognitive and motivational factors, such as political involvement (Jennings, 1992) , strength of partisan identity (Layman & Carsey, 2002) , or political knowledge (Goren, 2004) , affects how people organize their policy opinions. Other works highlight the influence of bundle concepts that combine cognitive and motivational variables into a single factor (Neuman, 1986; Stimson, 1975) . We take the latter path by focusing on the bundle concept of ideological engagement, which we define as a combination of liberal-conservative attachment, political knowledge, and political involvement. Each of these dimensions of ideological engagement equips citizens with some measure of motivation or ability to see the issue space of American politics in liberal-conservative terms. Rather than examine each trait's effect in isolation, as has been done in most work, we model their joint effect on ideological structure in the mass electorate.
We now elaborate the conceptualization of ideological engagement. First, ideological attachment denotes liberal or conservative self-identification. Those that categorize themselves as liberal or conservative have chosen sides on the fundamental cleavage that defines political conflict in this country. As such, they are committed to the worldviews shared by fellow ideologues and opinion leaders. Second, by political knowledge, we mean the extent to which people are cognitively engaged with public affairs. With political knowledge, citizens can respond more effectively to liberal-conservative cues embedded in elite discourse and transmitted through the mass media. Third, political involvement denotes how much someone cares about and participates in politics. Political involvement has both psychological components, such as habitually tracking political developments through the mass media, and behavioral components, such as regularly voting in elections or working for a given cause (Abramowitz, 2011; Zaller, 1992) .
All else equal, policy opinions should be more tightly organized among more sophisticated and engaged subsets of the electorate. The theoretical rationale is as follows. According to theories of opinion leadership, political elites synthesize disparate idea elements into coherent packages and disseminate these via public debate through the mass media. Citizens do not think long and hard about public affairs; instead, they typically take cues from political leaders they see in the news to deduce their own positions. However, opinion leadership does not affect those who ignore the debate and thereby miss the cues. Politically engaged citizens follow elite discourse more closely than those detached from politics, and hence, are more likely to learn which issue positions are consistent with their political priors (Berinsky, 2009; Zaller, 1992) .
Because the issue space of American politics can be described in liberalconservative terms, the belief systems of highly engaged citizens should more closely approximate this dimension than those of less engaged citizens.
That is precisely what accumulated research shows (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Knight, 1985) . For example, in his careful analysis of 1980 NES data, Jennings (1992) reports an average correlation of .22 for seven policy opinions for politically involved respondents versus .08 for uninvolved respondents. Note that the level of left-right structure evident among the most informed strata in the electorate is far from impressive. Politically involved citizens manifest greater ideological consistency than the politically apathetic, but even so, according to prior work, the level of ideological structure remains underwhelming.
Although left-right structure has not been readily detectable among the masses, no such difficulties prevail when attention turns to political elites. A rich vein of research shows that congressional candidates, opinion leaders, and party activists organize their policy preferences in liberal-conservative terms. To take some examples, Converse (1964) finds much higher levels of opinion consistency among congressional candidates as compared with NES respondents in 1958. McClosky and Zaller (1984) discover the same when comparing national opinion leaders and mass samples in 1975 to 1977. To return to Jennings (1992) , the mean level of issue constraint in the 1980 convention delegate sample equals .46 versus .22 for the most informed members of the mass public in the 1980 NES. In sum, ideological consistency for elites greatly exceeds that in the most engaged subsets of the U.S. public.
As these studies were conducted before polarization became a key feature of American politics, the failure to discern more than trace levels of ideological structure in the minds of Americans-the most sophisticated included-is no surprise. The study of elite polarization and attitude structure in the mass public has received renewed attention in recent years (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Layman & Carsey, 2002) . These works show that as political elites became more polarized over time, the mass public came to hold more highly constrained attitudes. In light of the changes that have occurred at the elite level, these results make sense. From the 1950s to the late 1970s, liberal-conservative conflict at the elite level was muted to a considerable extent by the presence of ideological heterogeneity within, and thus, across the parties. Since that time, the parties have moved farther apart on the liberal-conservative spectrum as moderates in the House and Senate have been replaced by more extreme members. Thus, the congressional wings of the parties were much farther apart by Bill Clinton's first term than during the Nixon-Ford-Carter years (Brewer & Stonecash, 2009; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006) . Also, the media environment has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Not only has the news cycle become 24 hr a day, but the media has fragmented into specialized outlets, many of which have an ideological bent, that has drastically changed information exposure and consumption patterns. No longer constrained to watch one of the three networks, people can access theoften slanted-news they want anytime anywhere (Levendusky, 2013; Prior, 2007) . In light of these changes, there is little doubt that political elites broadcast louder signals about "what goes with what" in ideological space than they did a generation ago and that the ability of citizens to access these signals through specialized news outlets has never been greater.
But do these changes reflect growing ideological competence? Portions of the electorate may have moved beyond the baseline of ideological mindlessness that prevailed from the 1950s through the 1970s, but such an accomplishment merits no praise. Absent a clear standard of progress, it is difficult to say whether rising levels of consistency signify genuine strides in the ideological coherence of public opinion or something less. To provide leverage on this question, we follow Jennings (1992) by using party elites as a benchmark for assessing attitude coherence. However, we go beyond this and similar studies (e.g., Converse, 1964) , as well as work on polarization and constraint in the American public (e.g., Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008) , by comparing mass and elite samples before and after the onset of elite polarization. In so doing, we can see how close politically engaged masses have moved to elites. If politically active citizens match party elite levels, we might infer that not only have they improved over time but, equally important, that the degree of improvement has been remarkable.
To summarize, prior work on mass-elite variation in attitude consistency and structure highlights vast discrepancies across these populations. However, because these conclusions rest on studies conducted long before elite polarization and media proliferation altered the political landscape, they may no longer apply to the contemporary political scene. Indeed, as polarization has continued apace for several decades and levels of ideological awareness and political participation have risen substantially at the same time (Abramowitz, 2011) , it seems likely that the gap between political elites and the most ideologically engaged subsets of the electorate has narrowed considerably if not entirely. From this framework, we derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): We should uncover the familiar pattern of stratification in the mass public whereby the most ideologically engaged citizens manifest the highest levels of consistent structure across issues spanning multiple policy domains compared with less ideologically engaged citizens.
Hypothesis 2 (H2):
In the pre-polarization era, ideologically engaged masses should lag party leaders and activists on consistency. Hypothesis 3 (H3): In the polarized era, the belief systems of ideologically engaged masses should be about as tightly structured as those of elites.
Data and Measures
The data necessary to test these hypotheses must satisfy four conditions. First, we need surveys from before and after polarization began in earnest. Second, multiple policy domains and opinion items should be present. Third, within any given year, the opinion items should be worded as closely as possible to ensure any mass-elite differences in consistency cannot be attributed to question wording or item selection differences. Fourth, large mass samples are necessary to provide a sufficient number of cases for analysis after we stratify on the individual difference variables. The 1980 and 1992 NES and CDS surveys satisfy these conditions. 1 In addition, we utilize the 1996 NES and 2000 CDS surveys to demonstrate that there is nothing unusual about the 1992 results. 2 We use the 2000 CDS because no delegate survey was administered in 1996. The 2000 NES is less useful because the stratified ideological engagement samples are too small (due partly to split-ballot question wording experiments) to permit stable estimation using the measurement modeling techniques described below. Thus, we compare the 1996 NES with the 2000 CDS.
To begin, recall Jennings (1992) found little evidence that the public in general, or politically involved citizens in particular, held ideologically consistent opinions during the early years of polarization. We use the 1980 prepolarization data to establish that the same results hold using our more comprehensive measure of ideological engagement and different statistical methods. By the early 1990s, polarization in Congress had reached levels not seen since the Roaring Twenties, so it makes sense to test for ideological structure using the 1992 data.
Next, we draw opinion items from the social welfare, cultural/moral, national security, environmental, and business/regulation policy domains, all of which represent fundamental issue cleavages in American politics. Question wording across samples is quite similar in 1980 and 1992, and the NES samples are large enough to permit statistical analysis for ideologically engaged and unengaged subsets.
A question immediately arises: Are convention delegates political elites? So far as attendees stand apart from the mass public in political commitment and involvement, the answer is yes. First, delegates qualify as political elites because they are more interested in and knowledgeable about politics, and they extend far more participatory effort, both prior to and during their convention attendance, than the vast majority of Americans. In many cases, delegates are not simply chosen by the ordinary voters, but instead must navigate their way through a multi-step process, requiring tremendous political motivation, skill, and dedication, to reach the convention. Once selected, delegates must also travel far to convention grounds and spend several days participating in party functions. In addition to nominating presidential candidates, they ratify party platforms, determine convention rules, and participate in other party matters (Kirkpatrick, 1976; Miller & Jennings, 1986) . Indeed, the very act of attending the convention sets delegates apart from virtually everyone in the mass public, no matter how sophisticated ordinary citizens might be. 3 Second, many delegates have held elected office at the national, state, or local levels. Many others have held formal positions in party organizations at all levels of government. Hence, some delegates are political elites by virtue of having held elected office or party positions. Although delegates are not representative of all political elites, they reflect a key subset that is willing to respond to surveys (Kirkpatrick, 1976) . Summing up, we concur with others who regard convention delegates as a class of political elites (Herrera, 1992; Jennings, 1992; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, & Cooperman, 2010; McClosky, 1964) .
Turning to measurement, we operationalize ideological engagement across the NES surveys as follows. First, respondents who chose "extreme" liberal/ conservative, "liberal," or "conservative" on the standard 7-point scale are coded as ideologically attached. Those who chose other options, "don't know," or "no opinion" are designated as unattached. To tap political awareness, we use the NES interviewer rating of respondents' general level of information about politics and public affairs. We code respondents rated "very high" or "fairly high" as informed and designate respondents rated as "average," "fairly low," or "very low" as uninformed. 4 To measure political involvement, we construct a multiple indicator scale based on whether respondents voted; tried to persuade others how to vote; displayed a campaign button, sticker, or sign; attended political meetings or rallies; worked for a party or candidate; are interested in campaigns; and/or are interested in politics. This yields a 0-7 scale. After experimenting with different cut-points that divided the distribution, we settled on a cut-point of 2.2 on the scale, which leaves us with a politically involved segment that averages around 55% and a politically uninvolved segment that averages about 45% across the surveys. A score of 2.2 or higher generally denotes respondents who turned out to vote and expressed at least moderate interest in campaigns and in politics, as well as those who engaged in other more demanding participatory acts (e.g., tried to persuade others how to vote, displayed a campaign button, etc.). In short, a score of 2.2 reflects a significant amount of political involvement.
Given these three measures, we combine them into a single ideological engagement variable as follows. Ideologically attached respondents in the top half of the awareness and involvement distributions are scored as "ideologically engaged." 5 Ideologically unattached respondents in the bottom half of the awareness and involvement distributions are "ideologically unengaged." Those with other combinations on the individual differences variables are "medium engaged."
How does our approach compare with prior work? Many works focus on a single attribute of the broader concepts of ideological sophistication or ideological engagement. For instance, some researchers rely on the levels of conceptualization index to classify respondents into different strata of ideological sophistication (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960 ). In contrast, Jennings (1992) uses political participation scores to classify respondents into different strata of political involvement. Our approach builds on prior work by incorporating multiple measures of different attributes of ideological engagement (i.e., attachment, knowledge, and involvement).
What share of the NES surveys fall into our high engagement category? High engagement respondents represent 10% of the 1980 NES, 13% of the 1992 NES, and 12% of the 1996 NES. Two points deserve emphasis. First, the share of the ideologically engaged has risen from 1980 to the 1990s, which conforms to the pattern noted by Abramowitz (2011) . Second, this represents a meaningful portion of the population. A 10% to 13% share of ideologically engaged citizens strikes us as large enough to make its voice heard and exercise real influence in the political process.
Regarding the policy items, we use a mix of opinion items and feeling thermometers for groups tied to issues. 6 We gauge social welfare opinion using a mix of standard questions on government services, health insurance, limited government, and economic aid to Blacks, along with multiple-indicator scales based on questions about whether federal spending on welfare state programs should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same. For cultural/moral attitudes, we use feeling thermometers for the women's liberation movement, feminists, abortion rights supporters, the Moral Majority, and gays and lesbians; an abortion scale; support for the Equal Rights Amendment; a gender equality scale; and support for forced busing. To gauge national security opinion, we use the standard defense spending scale, a question on U.S.-Russia relations, and one on the use of military force. Finally, for the environmental and business/regulation domains, we use questions on environmental regulations, the inflation-unemployment trade-off, and feeling thermometers for big business, labor unions, and environmentalists. 7
Statistical Analysis
We use a pair of statistical techniques to assess attitude consistency. First, we report bivariate correlations for policy opinions in the mass and elite samples. Higher correlations signify greater attitude consistency, and thus, can be interpreted as evidence of belief system organization. Second, we apply confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to the raw covariance matrix in each sample. This technique generates statistical estimates that speak directly to attitude structure as detailed below. Table 1 reports a series of mean Pearson r values for the 1980 NES and CDS samples, with the former stratified by ideological engagement. We report the average correlation for 5 cultural/moral questions (r 1 ), 2 national security items (r 2 ), 5 business/regulation items (r 3 ), 3 additive scales comprised of the germane items in each policy domain (r 4 ), and the 66 pairwise correlations across the 12 items (r 5 ). We focus on r 4 and r 5 . The first takeaway point is that the mean correlations are very low to moderate across the 1980 mass samples. This can be seen most readily in the r 5 estimates, which return values of .04 for ideologically unengaged masses, .10 for moderately engaged masses, and .27 for the most engaged. The same pattern holds for the mean correlation between the three domain-specific scales: r 4 = .12 in the low group, .20 in the medium group, and .47 in the high group. Although our individual differences variable and policy items differ from Jennings (1992) , the Table 1 results bear a close resemblance to his findings. The same holds true when we turn to delegates. In the 1980 CDS sample, r 4 = .71 and r 5 = .48. The difference column reveals that the r 4 and r 5 means for the elite sample exceed the estimates for the highly engaged mass sample by .24 and .21, respectively. Consistent with prior work, even the most engaged masses do not approach political elites in terms of left-right structure in the pre-polarization era.
If our theoretical expectations are on the mark, we should find that ideologically sophisticated citizens drew much closer to party elites by the 1990s. Table 2 reports the correlation means for our three issue areas (r 1 for social welfare issues, r 2 for cultural/moral issues, and r 3 for national security issues), for the three additive scales (r 4 ), and for the 45 pairwise correlations (r 5 ). To start with the NES data, the three additive scales are strongly correlated for engaged masses (r 4 = .51). The same holds true for the mean pairwise correlation (r 5 = .41). In contrast, these correlations prove much weaker for moderately engaged (r 4 = .23, r 5 = .17) and unengaged (r 4 = .06, r 5 = .08) respondents. Finally, we find high levels of ideological structure in the convention delegate sample with r 4 = .58 and r 5 = .45. Note the greatly diminished differences between ideologically engaged masses and elites. We predicted that ideologically sophisticated citizens would approach delegate-level ideological structure by 1992, and that is what we find. The difference between elites and highly engaged masses fell from .24 in 1980 to .07 in 1992 on r 4 and from .21 in 1980 to .04 in 1992 on r 5 . A generation of research has shown that even the most sophisticated members of the American electorate greatly lag elite populations in ideological structure. Table 1 confirms this. But although this may have been the case before polarization, Table 2 suggests it was no longer true by 1992.
So far our polarization era conclusions rest on data drawn from a single year. To strengthen our argument, we turn to the 1996 NES and 2000 CDS samples. Although we utilize some different measures in the social welfare and cultural issue domains and substitute environmental politics for national security as the third issue cluster, the correlations reported in Table 3 buttress  the Table 2 results. We stress three points. First, in the NES samples, ideological structure is always stronger among the highly engaged (r 4 = .68, r 5 = .53) than the moderately engaged (r 4 = .33, r 5 = .24) and the unengaged (r 4 = .14, r 5 = .14). Second, ideological consistency proves robust among delegates (r 4 = .71, r 5 = .59). Third, the issue opinions of ideologically engaged masses are almost as tightly organized as delegates' opinions. The r 4 difference favors elites by .03 whereas the r 5 correlation favors elites by .06.
Overall, Tables 1 to 3 yield three important conclusions. First, ideological structure varies systematically across cognitively heterogeneous populations in the mass public. Second, national party elites evince high levels of ideological organization. Third, ideologically engaged citizens in the polarized era prove nearly as skilled as party elites in aligning their policy opinions in left-right terms. Whereas past studies have found that all mass groups stood apart from elites in terms of belief system organization, our results suggest that by the 1990s, ideologically engaged citizens had left their brethren in the mass public behind and joined political elites. 8 Having examined the correlation techniques favored by some, we turn now to the CFA techniques favored by others. To assess attitude structure, we specify a measurement model that constrains the opinion items to load onto theoretically specified factors. If the posited model reflects attitude structure, it should reproduce the observed covariance matrix, which would be reflected in high values for goodness-of-fit statistics. As well, we should find robust standardized factor loadings, which can be interpreted as correlations between opinion scores and the latent attitudes hypothesized to shape them. Solid global fit and itemfactor correlations imply a high degree of attitude consistency. Following standard practice, we report the χ 2 test of global fit; however, given its limitations we also report the non-normed fit index (NNFI) which summarizes the incremental improvement in fit relative to a baseline model where all observed covariances are zero. Values close to .95 reflect good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999) . Table 4 contains the 1980 CFA estimates. 9 We specify a model in which policy opinions are arranged into the following three clusters: cultural/moral, national security, and business/regulation domains. We do so because prior work suggests that multi-dimensional structures prevail throughout the public (Goren, 2004; Layman & Carsey, 2002) . 10 Recall we expect to find variable degrees of structure within the mass samples, and further, that the most ideologically engaged masses will trail convention delegates on this score in the pre-polarization era. The 1980 data confirm our expectations. To start with the NES data, model fit is poor in low and medium engagement samples (NNFI Low = .79; NNFI Med = .75). The mean standardized factor loading also leaves much to be desired in the low ( λ = .22 ) and medium ( λ = .40 ) categories. Although model fit is demonstrably better among ideologically engaged respondents, it falls well short of the recommended .95 cut-point (NNFI High = .85). The mean factor loading is marginal for engaged respondents as well ( λ = .56 ). Overall, we have limited evidence of much structure in the most sophisticated 1980 NES sample. In contrast, we observe much more attitude structure among the 1980 delegates. Model fit is very good (NNFI = .94) and the mean factor loading proves strong ( λ = .72 ). Party elites thus best ideologically engaged masses on every statistical criterion. The standardized factor loadings are especially revealing: they indicate that party elites do a much better job translating latent policy attitudes into opinion statements in different issue domains. The bottom of Table 4 underscores a final mass-elite difference. Whereas 91% of delegates answer all policy questions, only 25% to 53% of the mass samples do so. 11 Hence, whatever structure emerges among the most engaged segment in the public is limited to those who actually held opinions on the issues. Table 5 reports the CFA estimates for 1992. Our model specifies that policy opinions are organized in social welfare, cultural, and national security domains. We not only expect stratification within mass samples but also that the most sophisticated will now, in the era of polarization, equal political elites in belief system structure. To start, we find solid model fit in the low and medium engagement samples (NNFI Low = .88 and NNFI Med = .91) and outstanding fit in the high (NNFI High = .98) and delegate (NNFI = .99) samples. More importantly, the mean standardized factor loading is .45 for unengaged masses, .53 for moderately engaged masses, .72 for highly engaged masses, and .73 for the party delegates. These estimates imply that ideologically engaged citizens do as well as national party activists and leaders at translating latent attitudes into opinion responses across the 10 items. In contrast, moderately engaged and less engaged citizens perform far worse. Finally, note that opinion-holding rates are nearly comparable in our ideologically engaged mass and elite samples (the latter rate exceeds the former by .09). In short, the Table 5 estimates reveal a striking degree of belief system organization among convention delegates and ideologically aware masses in the era of polarization.
Do these results generalize beyond 1992? Table 6 shows that they do indeed. The NNFI reveals that the three-factor model fits the data exceptionally well in the ideologically engaged NES sample and the CDS sample (.97). In the middle and low engagement NES samples, model fit proves less impressive. Next, we obtain middling factor loadings in the low and medium mass samples (.51 and .60) and much stronger item-factor correlations in the high mass (.78) and delegate (.81) samples. As predicted, ideologically sophisticated citizens and party elites do better integrating policy opinions than less sophisticated individuals. Most significantly, the engaged do as well as elites on this score. Evidently, there is nothing unique about 1992.
To summarize the results reported in Tables 1 to 6 , it does not matter if we utilize bivariate correlations or more sophisticated measurement modeling techniques. The conclusions we draw about ideological consistency and attitude structure do not change. Before polarization, party elites trump the masses. After polarization, ideologically engaged masses nearly match party elites. 12 Put another way, we have demonstrated that an ideologically sophisticated subset of the electorate organizes its policy views to a degree that most social scientists have long presumed political elites alone could accomplish. Source. 1992 NES and CDS surveys. Note. Direct (FIML) maximum likelihood estimates based on raw data input matrix. Standardized loadings reported. Latent and observed variables coded so higher scores reflect more conservative responses; therefore, each λ i should be positive. Proportion complete data indicates the proportion of each sample that answered 10 policy questions. CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; NNFI = non-normed fit index; NES = National Election Study; CDS = Convention Delegate Study; FIML = full information maximum likelihood. Source. 1996 NES and 2000 CDS surveys.
Note. Direct (FIML) maximum likelihood estimates based on raw data input matrix. Standardized loadings reported. Latent and observed variables coded so higher scores reflect more conservative responses; therefore, each λ i should be positive. Proportion complete data indicates the proportion of each sample that answered 12 policy questions. CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; NNFI = non-normed fit index; NES = National Election Study; CDS = Convention Delegate Study; FIML = full information maximum likelihood.
Our evidence suggests that by the early-to-mid 1990s, ideological consistency in policy opinion among politically engaged masses had caught up to Note. Pairwise correlations were used in the calculations. All variables have been coded to be positively related. The issues are abortion, aid to Blacks, government responsibility to ensure everyone has a job, defense spending, feeling thermometer for big business, and feeling thermometer for labor unions. NES = National Election Study.
the impressive levels manifested by party elites. Although intriguing, our conclusions must be viewed with caution. Our mass-elite comparisons were made using nearly identical issue questions within each year. Unfortunately, data limitations precluded us from using identical items to make mass-elite comparisons over time. An alternative interpretation of our results might be that improvement over time among the most sophisticated respondents arises as much from using different and perhaps easier questions as from "improved" voters. Given the problems that changes in question wording pose for making comparisons over time, this potential confound must not be taken lightly (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1978) . We can bring additional data to bear on the alternative interpretation. Although we lack a subset of identically worded items that appear in the NES and CDS samples over time, a common set of six policy-related items appears on every presidential year NES survey from 1980 to 2004. 13 With these data and our standard measure of ideological engagement, we can track levels of left-right opinion consistency over time for low, medium, and high engagement subsets in the public at large. Given (a) that ideological consistency in policy opinions results partly from exposure to and absorption of elite signals and (b) that the clarity of these signals increased as elites polarized from 1980 onward, we should observe increasing opinion consistency over time among highly engaged samples and no comparable increases among moderately engaged and unengaged samples. Table 7 reports the results. The cell entries represent the mean pairwise correlation for the six common items. The estimates affirm our expectations on both counts. We find no evidence of increasing opinion consistency over time among the unengaged and moderately engaged samples. In the former, the level of constraint never exceeds .04. In the latter, the level of constraint fluctuates between .08 and .11 in six of the seven surveys (the exception is the .17 correlation mean in 2000). Among highly engaged respondents, we find unequivocal evidence of rising left-right constraint. The mean correlation grows steadily from .27 in 1980 to .41 in 1996 to .45 by 2004. The biggest jump occurs from 1992 to 1996 (.30 to .41), perhaps in response to the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. In any case, the trend lines indicate that as elites polarized at the national level, left-right consistency in policy opinions grew more robust only among the most ideologically engaged elements in the electorate. In sum, these data suggest (but do not prove) that the temporal increases in ideological consistency and structure among the ideologically engaged reported above in Tables 1 to 6 are not an artifact of deploying different questions at different points in time.
Summary and Conclusion
Drawing on theoretical and empirical work on polarization and opinion leadership, we have argued that over the past several decades, ideological separation at the elite level and the increased availability of political news in general and ideologically slanted news in particular has created conditions necessary to facilitate the emergence of high levels of attitude structure at the mass level, but only among the most ideologically engaged strata. Our analysis of data from NES and CDS surveys covering 1980 to 2000 supports these claims. First, we have shown that although ideologically engaged masses held more consistent and structured issue opinions than less engaged masses in 1980, they trailed party elites by a substantial margin. Next, we found that party activists and leaders who attend the national party conventions manifest strikingly impressive levels of belief system organization both before and after polarization began. Finally, by 1992, the most ideologically engaged citizens in the electorate had largely caught up to elites in terms of left-right consistency and attitude structure. Roughly a decade after the onset of elite polarization and the emergence of new media outlets, the ideologically engaged came to hold policy opinions as tightly bound as those of political elites.
Our claims should be viewed as tentative pending replication using a larger set of policy domains and issues. The same holds true with regard to our elite group. We believe that side-by-side comparisons of everyday people and party activists yield novel insights into the nature of public opinion, but acknowledge that the question of whether these results generalize to other elite populations (e.g., congressional candidates) remains unsettled. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that ideological consistency is simply one element scholars have identified as indicative of political competence. Other criteria can be used to determine how citizens compare with political elites and we encourage future research on this front.
Our results contribute to the study of American politics in several respects. To begin, they demonstrate that the rise in opinion consistency in some strata of the public has been astonishing. Others have shown the public improved over a baseline of ideological innocence that prevailed for decades, but that is a weak standard by which to laud improvement. We have set the bar higher by comparing attitude structure in mass and elite populations. Despite the high bar, ideologically engaged citizens have acquitted themselves well. Claims that the mass public does not share "ideological patterns of belief with relevant elites" must now be discarded (Converse, 1964, p. 231) . Our results also speak directly to work on the new American voter, one for whom policy considerations are far more consequential today than in the past (Bafumi & Shapiro, 2009; Miller & Shanks, 1996) . We agree with this up to a point: Some voters possess tightly constrained belief systems, but not all. As others have noted (Abramowitz, 2011; Layman & Carsey, 2002) , the mass response to elite polarization has been limited to the most involved portions of the electorate. Studies that ignore individual differences miss a key part of this story.
In closing, we underscore a key implication our study has for evaluating representation in the contemporary United States. Elite political combat has become more ideologically charged over the past 30 years and such changes have spurred some citizens to conceptualize issues as elites do. So far as the liberal-conservative continuum animates elite political debate, those familiar with these frames of reference will have an easier time understanding the key fault line in the American political system and evaluating public officials and candidates for office along these lines. Our article suggests that a small but significant subset of the mass public-the ideologically engaged-has risen to this challenge.
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The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 1980, and February 7, 1981 (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993; Zaller, 1992) . A number of scholars have utilized this measure to distinguish the politically informed from the politically uninformed (Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2008; Bartels, 1996) . Our results do not change when we substitute a multi-indicator political knowledge scale for the interviewer assessment indicator. 5. Readers may wonder why we use these cut-points for awareness and involvement to distinguish the ideologically engaged from the unengaged. We set the bars as high as possible while leaving a sufficient number of cases to generate stable parameter estimates for the measurement modeling techniques we use below (this is why we need large NES samples). Readers might also wonder why we use constant cut-points. Recent work on polarization and sorting suggests that more people are becoming ideologically aware and involved over time (Abramowitz, 2011; Levendusky, 2009 ). As such, we need to guard against the possibility that any observed increase in opinion consistency over time is an artifact of picking off more engaged people in the public. The use of constant cut-points mitigates this problem. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 6. Following Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman (2010) and Highton and Kam (2011) , we have used feeling thermometers that can be tied directly to specific issues. To take two examples, we use feeling thermometers for abortion rights supporters and environmentalists. Responses to these items are reasonable proxies for opinion on the issues of abortion and environmental regulation, respectively. In other cases, feeling thermometer (e.g., labor unions) responses may be less directly tied to readily identifiable issue positions. 7. Although question format and wording are identical for many NES-CDS item pairs within years, some discrepancies exist. First, the language differs marginally on some questions. Second, the number of points on the feeling thermometers differs across surveys (we rescale these to be equal). Third, the 7-point scales in the NES samples include "no opinion" filters, which do not appear in the CDS. Although the omission of "no opinion" filters in the latter may result in lower levels of item non-response among elites, we suspect most are sufficiently engaged in politics that they would express policy opinions even if such filters had been included. The 1980 items appear in Online Appendix A1, the 1992 items appear in Online Appendix A2, and the 1996/2000 items are reported in Online Appendix A3. 8. Readers may wonder why we see no evidence of increasing elite consistency over time among party delegates. This might be a matter of using disparate measures across the different surveys. Alternatively, there might be a ceiling effect in place due to the presence of random measurement error in the survey questions. Elite-level constraint may have increased in the minds of convention delegates, but imperfect measurement might make it hard to detect increases beyond the already high levels we observe in the 1980 sample. 9. We use the EQS program (version 6.1) to generate model estimates using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) procedures applied to the raw data matrix. The FIML algorithm uses all available data from all cases to generate the parameter estimates. Cases with missing data on observed variables are not dropped from the sample in listwise fashion. In other words, each case i contributes to the estimation of all model parameters even it has missing data on some variables (see Enders & Bandalos, 2001 , for an explanation and assessment of FIML estimators in the context of structural equation models [SEM] ). SEM techniques assume that the observed variables are multivariate normally distributed. When this assumption is violated, the χ 2 test and standard errors are biased. To account for non-normality in the data, we report a robust χ 2 statistic (and a robust non-normed fit index [NNFI] ) that is more accurate than the standard maximum likelihood estimates (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996) . Our standard errors are also robust to violations of distributional assumptions. SEM techniques assume that all observed variables are measured at the interval level. Many of the items we use meet this assumption; however, other items do not. Simulation evidence suggests that the application of SEM to non-interval data is not problematic until the number of points on the scale drops below four (Bollen, 1989; Finney & Distefano, 2006; Zumbo, Gadermann, & Zeisser, 2007) . We use few items with less than four points. Last, we allow all factors to be correlated in the estimation stage, but we do not report these to preserve space. The correlations increase as we move from low mass to high mass to delegate samples. 10. We tested whether a one-dimensional confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model fits the data as well as, if not better than, the three-dimensional model. Online Appendices C1 to C3 report the estimates. These data furnish no evidence on behalf of the one-factor model. In every NES and CDS sample, the NNFI and mean factor loading deteriorate in the one-factor model. As well, a formal χ 2 test demonstrates that model fit of the one-factor model is significantly worse than that of the three-factor model in every NES and CDS sample. Like Treier and Hillygus (2009) and Ellis and Stimson (2012) , our efforts caution against presuming that responses to liberal-conservative self-placement scales reflect a unidimensional understanding of public policy. Policy opinion is more complicated than that. 11. We remind readers that our CFA estimates have been generated using all available data from all cases in each sample. 12. These results are robust to different operationalizations of ideological engagement. As discussed above, we use a 2.2 cut-point on the 0 to 7 scale to discriminate between high participation and low participation respondents. We experimented with different cut-points for the political involvement dimension of ideological engagement and found the same pattern of results. We report the results of one such replication in which we used a cut-point of 2.6 on the participation scale (see Tables B1-B7 in the online appendix). We also explored whether the results change when we use factual and ideological knowledge scales in place of the NES interviewer rating of respondents' general level of knowledge about politics and public affairs. The results do not change. 13. The items are abortion, defense spending, government efforts to ensure everyone has a job and a good standard of living, government efforts to improve the conditions of Blacks, and feeling thermometers for big business and labor unions. See Online Appendix A4 for question wording.
